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Prior to the Vancouver-Whistler 2010 winter Olympics, debate unfolded about the cost, nature, and extent 
of security measures to be employed at the Games. Staging the Olympics would clearly challenge the 
resources, tact, imagination, and abilities of police and security officials. Over and above the normal 
issues related to crowd control and safety associated with events such as Stanley Cup finals, fireworks 
displays, or other major public events, globally noteworthy spectacles such as the Olympics provide an 
unmatchable opportunity for any group wishing to seize international media attention to leverage 
significant exposure through boisterous demonstrations, disruption of events, grandstanding, or, if so 
inclined, violence and property damage.  
Surprisingly, policing authorities in Canada lack specific statutory authorization to take measures 
that might be thought necessary to their mission. Although the established choreography of public order 
policing in Canada has come to include the erection of security fences in public areas, the creation of 
designated “protest areas,” restricted access to public space, police surveillance, and searches without 
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cause,
1
 such measures intrude massively into the ordinary freedoms that law-abiding subjects enjoy. 
Although they may be desirable or even necessary at events of this nature, no Canadian legislature has 
ever expressly conferred such powers on the policing authorities outside of the context of international 
intergovernmental conferences (more on this below).2 The common law does not accord such powers to 
state officials in the absence of an empowering statute. 
A second-order question arises too: which policing measures would, if authorized by statute, pass 
constitutional muster? We are not there yet, however. The absence of statutes empowering police and 
                                               
1
 The RCMP have created an “Integrated Security Unit” to deal with the 2010 Olympics. As of the summer of 2009, 
the ISU has not made its security plan public, but a number of details have been noted in the media. The ISU will 
close the Dunsmuir and Georgia Viaducts near BC Place and General Motors Place, and “security zones” will be 
erected around both venues. These zones may cover significant portions of public space, including the seawall 
walkway around False Creek. Jeff Lee, “2010 Olympic Traffic Plans Pose Challenge for Everyone,” Vancouver Sun, 
November 25, 2008, http://communities.canada.com/vancouversun/blogs/insideolympics/archive/2008/11/25/2010-
olympic-traffic-plans-pose-challenge-for-everyone.aspx. The RCMP have sought bids for the supply of forty 
kilometres of “electronically monitored security fencing” for use around twenty-five Olympic venues. Damian 
Inwood, “Mounties Looking for Bidders to Supply Security Fencing,” The Province, January 17, 2008, 
http://www.canada.com/theprovince/news/story.html?id=ae09ad7f-d82f-4ac8-a1a4-091c01716613. The ISU’s 
Community Relations Group has consulted with activist groups about “possible protest zones sanctioned by police.” 
Rod Mickleburgh, “Olympic Security Boss Puts Protesters on Notice,” Globe and Mail, January 23, 2009, 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20090123.wbcolympicsecurity23/BNStory/National/?page
=rss&id=RTGAM.20090123.wbcolympicsecurity23. The RCMP also plan “to install hundreds of closed-circuit 
television cameras for security… [at] both athletic and public celebration venues.” “Vancouver Olympics Security 
Cameras Raise Privacy Concerns,” CBC Television, May 12, 2008, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/british-
columbia/story/2008/05/12/bc-olympic-security-cctv.html. (All sites accessed July 20, 2009.)  
2
 In July 2009, Vancouver City Council enacted an omnibus “2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games Bylaw” 
in order to fill the legal void around public order policing.  This purports to authorize a number of practices relating 
to security including closure of streets and other public spaces, the use of airport-style security checkpoints at certain 
sites; searches of persons and bags (without reasonable cause or warrant); video surveillance; and restrictions on the 
use of signage, megaphones, and other methods of expression. The by-law seeks to authorize some but not all of the 
security tactics that may be used at the Olympics, putting them under municipal control. See 
http://vancouver.ca/ctyclerk/cclerk/20090721/documents/a4.pdf (access on July 20, 2009).  A by-law cannot take the 
place of public order policing legislation however: its vires is unclear, its scope limited and its reach is confined to 
one municipality only. 
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guiding their conduct at major public events is triply unfortunate. First, the police are put in an untenable 
situation when they are called upon to undertake complex and important tasks in a legal vacuum. Police 
are entitled to direction from the legislature. Second, from the perspective of legality, a crisis of principle 
arises. Because the legislature has not spoken, police officials are forced to make up their own guidelines 
as they go. Developed without legal authorization and secretly, without any form of public review, they 
lack the quality of law. Third, citizens are left in a legal limbo, their rights affected by police actions that 
cannot be measured against any publicly disclosed standard. Core rights of assembly, expression, and 
protest are all compromised. So too are the rights of businesses, homeowners, and ordinary citizens to go 
about their routine activities without interruption. If such infringements are indeed both necessary and 
constitutionally justifiable, they need, first, to be authorized by law. 
For these reasons, Canadian provinces and territories should adopt some form of “Public Order 
Policing legislation.” Such laws would authorize the creation of police exclusion zones, providing 
principled and explicit guidance to their proper extent and duration. Criteria could be established guiding 
who would be allowed admission to “secure” areas (workers, business owners, homeowners, emergency 
medical personnel, security officials, journalists, and others?), specifying decision-making processes, 
establishing principles of compensation for those who suffer financial injury as a result of the creation of 
security perimeters, setting out “notice” requirements, and so on. If entry to otherwise public space is to 
be permitted only following airport-style searches, then explicit statutory authorization would both give 
comfort to security officials and clarify the limits of their authority for citizens.3 Attempts to side-step the 
issue by “deeming” public property to be private (e.g., property of the International Olympic Committee, 
                                               
3
 The Commission for Public Complaints against the RCMP recently ruled alcohol searches at public events to be 
improper: 
http://www.theprovince.com/cars/Watchdog+rules+Victoria+police+Canada+liquor+searches+lawful/1437260/story
.html ; http://www.cpc-cpp.gc.ca/nrm/nr/2009/20090327-eng.aspx (accessed July 20, 2009).  Despite this, 
Vancouver Police continued to search for unopened alcohol during the summer 2009 Fireworks displays in that city, 
provoking a complaint from the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association: 
http://rightscity.org/police/2009/07/28/bccla-lodges-police-complaint-after-unlawful-searches-reported-at-fireworks/ 
(accessed August 3, 2009) 
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APEC, the IMF, a hockey league or a fireworks organization) for short periods of time would amount to 
unseemly and colourable attempts to end-run Canadian constitutional foundations. 
 
Values at Stake 
Blanket prohibitions of protests combined with surveillance and a significant security presence produce 
orderly events. No such measures are or can be contemplated, however, in Canada. Liberal democracies 
avoid such behaviour as a matter of principle. Free peoples enjoy the freedom of movement, the freedom 
of expression, and the freedom to express themselves in the company of like-minded people — freedom 
of assembly. Although recognizably akin to the “rights” protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms,4 the constitutional centrality of such principles precedes the Charter.5 These rights emerge 
from centuries of constitutional development that Canada shares with the United Kingdom, the United 
States, and other common law countries.  Core Canadian values were emphasized by BC premier Gordon 
Campbell during a press conference at the Beijing games and in a context in which rather different 
notions of state power prevailed: “In Canada we will be open to opportunities for people to express 
whatever views they have,” he said. “There will not be opportunities to break the law, [but] we will make 
sure there will be full and equal expression throughout the 2010 Olympics.”6 
 
                                               
4
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereafter the 
Charter]. 
5
 The pre-Charter origin of constitutional protection for free expression, for example, registers strongly in Madam 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s reasons delivered in Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada, [1991] 1 
S.C.R. 139, [1991] S.C.J. No. 3 [hereafter Commonwealth of Canada], wherein pre-Charter authorities, including 
the following, are cited: Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.R. 285; Reference re: Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.R. 100; 
Boucher v. The King, [1951] S.C.R. 265; Saumur v. City of Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299; Fraser v. Public Service 
Staff Relations Board, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 455. 
6
 “Campbell fires back at Chinese critics,” Jeff Lee, Vancouver Sun, August 12, 2008, 
http://www.canada.com/vancouversun/news/story.html?id=c6c8fea0-740a-4026-8b03-09b8a3f1389b (accessed July 
20, 2009). 
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Values and interests come into conflict where public order is at issue. One group’s right to 
assembly necessarily interferes with another’s freedoms. Speaking loosely, disturbance of the “peace” is 
to some degree a necessary incident of public protest. Even the most peaceable multitude can seem 
intimidating and noisy. The presence of crowds impedes access to public and private property, and the 
peaceable enjoyment of land or other property may be disrupted. Large gatherings obstruct passage, 
inhibiting, to a degree, the freedom of movement of others. Moreover, even the most law-abiding crowd 
can provide cover for hooligans, vandals, troublemakers, and individuals intent on criminal assault or 
worse. Important as they are, the rights of assembly, movement, and protest are not unqualified. They can 
— and should — be balanced against other important public needs. The balancing should be steered by 
law, directed by statute. The alternatives of chaos or unilateral police usurpation of powers that are not 
theirs are equally unpalatable. 
 
Part 2: Limits of Public Order Policing Power in Canada 
At large public gatherings, police commonly erect fences or barricades to channel the movement of 
people, close off entire areas of public space, and issue police passes allowing entry to selected 
individuals. Knowing that they lack statutory authority, Canadian policing officials have hoped, falsely, 
that such powers can be derived from the ancient duties of peace officers to protect life and property, 
preserve peace, and prevent crime. Their hope is unfounded as such an outcome would require an 
untenable extrapolation of a limited, though ancient, police power. 
The leading authority, R. v. Knowlton,7 was decided in the Supreme Court of Canada a generation 
ago. The case arose from a modest policing incident when the premier of the Soviet Union, Alexey 
Kosygin, visited Edmonton in the early 1970s. He had been attacked by an unarmed man while walking 
on Parliament Hill with Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. Although Kosygin was quickly rescued by the 
                                               
7
 R. v. Knowlton, [1974] S.C.R. 443 [hereafter Knowlton]. 
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prime minister,8 officials realized that the minor incident could have turned out very differently if the 
attacker had been armed or more determined. Fearful of the possibilities, Edmonton police created a 
security zone around a downtown hotel for the Soviet premier’s itinerary. The security perimeter 
generally followed the hotel’s property lines but also obstructed a small portion of the sidewalk on an 
adjacent public street. E.J.N. Knowlton told police that he intended to walk along that portion of the 
sidewalk in order to take pictures and that he viewed the barricade as an unlawful interference with his 
right to move freely on a public street. Upon breaching the perimeter, he was arrested and charged with 
obstructing a peace officer. 
Provincial Court Judge Rennie acquitted Knowlton, reasoning that, in the absence of statutory 
authority, the police could not so interfere with a law-abiding citizen: “[T]he police at the relevant time 
were not enforcing any provisions of the Criminal Code, or any by-law or other law and … therefore they 
were not acting in the execution of their duty….”9 On appeal, a unanimous bench of the Supreme Court of 
Canada10 agreed that police power does not float free of common law and statute. The court accepted that 
the police had interfered with the “liberty of the appellant,” including his undoubted legal “right to 
circulate freely on a public street,”11 but upheld police action in the particular circumstances. The trial 
judge had not properly taken into account the ancient common law duty of “constables” to preserve the 
peace and to prevent crime, duties imported into the Canadian Criminal Code and into legislation 
governing police forces across Canada. The common law authority was explicitly extended to Alberta’s 
police under section 3 of the Alberta Police Act (1971),12 which stated that police had the power to 
“perform all duties that are assigned to police officers” in relation to preserving the peace, preventing 
                                               
8
 John McKay, “Trudeau Left Indelible Impressions with Everyone He Touched, Even Reporters,” Canadian Press 
October 1, 2000.  
9
 As cited in Knowlton, at 445. 
10
 Fauteux C.J. and Abbott, Martland, Judson, Ritchie, Hall, Spence, Pigeon, and Laskin JJ. 
11
 Knowlton, at 446. 
12
 c. 85. 
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crime, and apprehending offenders who may lawfully be taken into custody.13 Given the earlier assault on 
the Soviet premier, the court thought it reasonable for police to seek to guard against further disturbance 
of the peace or criminal assault. In the particular circumstances, obstruction of a small stretch of sidewalk 
represented a reasonable instance of the general authority of constables to preserve the peace, prevent 
crime, protect public safety, preserve order, and prevent offences against provincial laws. The court also 
thought it proper for police to screen people passing through a security barricade, to selectively bar some 
individuals from entry to the private property within the barricade, and to issue “passes” for those who 
were able to satisfy police as to their backgrounds, intentions, and objectives. 
Mr. Justice Fauteux’s words do not offer virtual carte blanche to police officers to do whatever 
they want, provided only that they seek to preserve the peace and prevent crime. Such a proposition is 
entirely untenable. When, after all, would police officers acting in good faith not be motivated by a desire 
to preserve the peace and prevent crime? The severest and most intrusive conceivable measures could 
pass this test, yet no such unlimited police licence was, is, or could be part of Canadian law. The ratio 
decidendi of Knowlton — its binding principle — was a good deal narrower than words taken out of 
context might suggest. The public’s freedom of movement had been (1) minimally restricted, (2) for a 
limited time, and (3) over an inconsequentially small area of public street directly adjacent to 
consensually policed private property — and in circumstances where there was clearly good reason to 
fear an assault on a controversial visiting statesman. 
Nearly thirty years later similar issues arose during the 2001 Quebec City Summit of the 
Americas conference. The judge in Tremblay c. Québec (Procureur général) described the background to 
the case: 
The authorities have set up a substantial security barrier around the third Summit of the Americas, 
which Quebec City will host for three days beginning on Friday April 20th, to protect the 34 
participating heads of state, their delegates and the general public. Among other measures, in the 
                                               
13
 Knowlton, at 447. 
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Upper Town there will be a fenced security perimeter which may only be entered by certified 
persons (dignitaries, journalists, Summit employees and police officers) as well as residents, 
workers, businessmen and civil servants holding a pass issued by the RCMP.14 
M. Tremblay, a Montreal lawyer, took the view that, absent express statutory restrictions, he and other 
law-abiding citizens had a right to move freely within Canada and to make a personal, peaceful protest in 
front of the Quebec Congress Centre. Police officials failed to grant him a “pass” permitting entry to the 
walled zone. Tremblay sought a permanent injunction, alleging that the barricades interfered with his 
rights under the Charter . He asked that the barrier be removed or that a full-access pass be issued to him. 
Although the case turned on an analysis of general police powers, the question of the extent of 
police authority was approached through a Charter analysis, not through an assessment of their statutory 
or common law powers. This misstep profoundly distorted the analysis. It was clear that the intended 
police action at the Summit of the Americas would inhibit conventional freedoms, including those of 
peaceful protest and freedom of expression,15 and his lordship thought that the arrangements could only 
be upheld under section 1 of the Charter. As in Knowlton (which went uncited), no statute expressly 
authorized the actions taken by police. 
Mr. Justice Blanchet noted that rights may be limited by a “rule of law” within the meaning of 
section 1. Citing the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Cloutier v. Langlois,16 Blanchet J. took the 
view that police conduct interfering with rights could be justified so long as it is necessary for carrying 
out a statutory duty and provided that it is reasonable, “having regard to ... the importance of the public 
                                               
14
 Tremblay c. Québec (Procureur général), [2001] J.Q. no. 1504, para. 1, per Gilles Blanchet J [hereafter 
Tremblay]. The ruling is translated into English in W. Wesley Pue, “Trespass and Expressive Rights,” The 
Ipperwash Inquiry (2007), at 52–77 (Appendix), 
http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/ipperwash/policy_part/research/pdf/Pue.pdf (accessed July 20, 
2009). 
15
 Tremblay, para. 63. 
16
 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158 [hereafter Cloutier]. 
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purpose served by the interference.”17 He then looked to the duties imposed upon police officers under 
section 18 of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act,18 sections 2(b) and 6 of the Security Offences 
Act,19 and section 2 of the Criminal Code.20 
The general legal principle established in Cloutier v. Langlois is more limited, however, than 
Blanchet J.’s gloss allows. That case dealt with the legality of a police “frisk search” incidental to arrest 
— circumstances wildly different from the zoning of a city. Madam Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, for the 
court, crafted a two-stage approach to police powers. First, does statute or common law impose a 
particular duty on peace officers? The standard here is demanding. The duty must be “clearly identified.” 
It must have been historically recognized by the courts.21 Second, only after this threshold is crossed does 
another stage of inquiry become relevant: which invasions of individual rights are necessary for that duty 
to be fulfilled? It is only infringements that are, strictly speaking, necessary for well-established police 
duties to be fulfilled that can be taken as reasonably implied by the initial grant of power, authority, or 
duty. This is a demanding test. The interference with rights must be both necessary and calibrated 
reasonably in relation to the nature of the liberty interfered with, taking all competing public interests into 
account. 
 The ruling in Tremblay skated quickly over difficult questions relating to the general scope of 
police duties and necessarily ancillary police powers. The relevant portions of each of the statutes that 
Blanchet J. looked to are in fact expressed in broad terms of the sort that would not normally be construed 
as authorizing significant violations of ordinary freedoms and liberties. Section 18 of the RCMP Act, for 
example, enumerates a number of duties on peace officers of a general nature, including preserving the 
peace, preventing crime, and enforcing the law. The language of this section has deep historical roots in 
                                               
17
 Cloutier, at 181. 
18
 R.S. c. R-9 (R-10). 
19
 R.S. c. S-7 (1984, c. 21, s. 56). 
20
 R.S. c. 34 [hereafter Criminal Code]. 
21
 Cloutier, para. 50. 
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the common law (“all duties that are assigned to peace officers in relation to the preservation of the 
peace”)22 but was not thoroughly analyzed in Tremblay.23 
The Security Offences Act, for its part, serves to delineate the boundary between federal and 
provincial jurisdiction in certain areas. It establishes the primacy of the federal government by assigning 
responsibility to the federal attorney general to “conduct proceedings” and “exercise all the powers and 
perform all the duties and functions assigned by or under the Criminal Code to the Attorney General” 
with respect to both security offences (as defined in the CSIS Act) and offences against “internationally 
protected persons” (IPPs).24 Nothing here creates a new police power. On the contrary, the duties of 
RCMP officers are expressly said to be those of “peace officers.” 
When we turn to the Criminal Code, it is apparent that a profound misunderstanding of the phrase 
“internationally protected persons” infects the Tremblay decision. The term found its way into Canadian 
law so as to give domestic expression to obligations under long-standing principles of international law, 
designed to protect individuals engaged in diplomacy from harassment. In international law, the long-
standing principle finds expression in the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
against Internationally Protected Persons.25 The category of “internationally protected person” includes 
heads of state, heads of government, ministers of foreign affairs, and representatives or officials of either 
a state or certain types of international organizations, as well as their families, and the Criminal Code 
speaks of categories of individuals “entitled, pursuant to international law, to special protection from any 
                                               
22
 See too section 9 of the RCMP Act, R.S., 1985, c. R-10, which also emphasizes that “the powers, authority, 
protection and privilege” of RCMP constables are those of a “peace officer.” 
23
 In Vancouver (City) Police Department v. British Columbia (Police Complaint Commissioner), [2001] B.C.J. No. 
1405; 2001 BCCA 446 (BCCA) (“the Doern Case”), para. 20, Madam Justice Southin emphasized, obiter, that 
peace officers, unlike soldiers in Her Majesty’s forces, are generally not entitled to rely on defences of superior 
command for unlawful conduct: “I do not myself consider that authorities on the responsibility of senior officers of 
Her Majesty’s forces for the conduct of the troops under their command are apposite in issues relating to peace 
officers. A peace officer’s individual duty is to see that the Queen’s peace is maintained and that those who breach 
it, whether they be other peace officers or civilians, are brought to account.” 
24
 See sections 2(a) and (b) of the Security Offences Act. 
25
 http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/inprotectedpersons.html (accessed July 20, 2009). 
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attack on [their] person, freedom or dignity….”26 Confusion has arisen from wording requiring the 
protection of the “person, freedom or dignity” of IPPs, and “dignity” turns out to be the rub. Peace 
officers and government officials have sometimes incorrectly taken this to mean that visiting dignitaries 
should be shielded from exposure to the very sorts of discomfiting free expression that democratic 
countries cherish.27 In giving statutory expression to long-standing principles of international relations, 
Canada’s Parliament cannot be presumed to have intended to create a new Constitution-trashing offence 
relating to “dignity.”28 
The statutes reviewed in Tremblay, in other words, provide no legal grant of authority for the 
erection of barriers, for the zoning of public space, or for limiting mobility, constraining — or relocating 
— free speech, interfering with businesses, impeding access to homes, or establishing a system of 
“passes” that might have conferred lawful authority on the security arrangements in place for the Summit 
of the Americas. His lordship, in effect, presumed that such authority derived, somehow, from these 
statutes and skated too quickly past the fundamental question of statutory authority. Mr. Justice Blanchet 
proceeded to the conventional two-part Charter analysis. First, were Charter rights infringed? Second, if 
so, was the infringement “demonstrably” justifiable in a free and democratic society so as to be lawful 
under a section 1 analysis? There was no question on the first. The measures taken had “the effect of 
limiting to a great extent two of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by section 2 of the Charter, namely 
                                               
26
 See the definition of “internationally protected person” in section 2 of the Criminal Code. 
27
 For example, Obiora Okafor, “The 1997 APEC Summit and the Security of Internationally Protected Persons: Did 
Someone Say ‘Suharto’?,” in Pepper in Our Eyes: The APEC Affair (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000), ed. W. Wesley 
Pue, 185–96. 
28
 Section 424 of the Criminal Code specifies punishments for individuals who threaten offences against 
international persons that would violate other sections of the Criminal Code. The listed sections are 235 (murder), 
236 (manslaughter), 266 (assault), 268 (aggravated assault), 269 (assault causing bodily harm), 269.1 (torture), 271 
(sexual assault), 272 (sexual assault with a weapon, threats to a third party, or causing bodily harm), 273 (aggravated 
sexual assault), 279 (kidnapping), 279.1 (hostage taking), and 431 (attack on premises, residence, or transport of 
internationally protected persons). 
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freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly.”29 Nonetheless, he upheld the arrangements 
under a section 1 analysis as demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society. Recall, however, 
that section 1 authorizes certain infringements of rights only if they are “prescribed by law.”  Thus, we 
return to the puzzle that logically precedes a Charter analysis: where is the legal source for the powers 
exercised? Although the ruling is somewhat cryptic in this regard, it seems that Mr. Justice Blanchet 
found the answer either in the historical duties of peace officers to preserve the peace and prevent crime 
(RCMP Act) or in the international obligation to protect the “person, freedom, or dignity” of 
internationally protected persons. It has been seen, however, that the second adds little. Thus, Tremblay 
turned on the historical obligations of constables. The same grounds, in other words, as those relied upon 
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Knowlton: actions taken as necessarily incidental to ordinary police 
powers. Yet here we are dealing with the zoning of a large area of public space in Quebec City, not with a 
sliver of sidewalk adjacent to a privately owned hotel in Edmonton. 
So enormous an extrapolation of the Knowlton principle cannot be good law. It bears noting that 
the Tremblay ruling emerged from less than optimal circumstances. Had Blanchet J. granted interlocutory 
relief, he would have dismantled security plans only days before a major international meeting that was 
certain to encounter massive protest. His lordship enjoyed neither the luxury of time nor the benefit of full 
argument and evidence. Although leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was refused, little can 
be read into this denial with respect to the court’s view on the substantive matters. 
The authority of police to create zones of exclusion either as an incident of the general and 
ancient duties of constables or under specific statutory authorization has never been established in the 
courts. The only case that comes close involves a ruling by a court of first instance, rendered in 
extraordinary circumstances and without the advantage of a full hearing. 
 
The Peace Officer’s Duty to Preserve the Peace and Prevent Crime 
                                               
29
 Tremblay, para. 102. 
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Tremblay cannot be taken to be good law. The ruling marks an enormous extension in scale from the 
virtually de minimus restrictions at issue in Knowlton. Whereas Knowlton involved exclusion primarily 
from private property and from a very small portion of an adjacent public street for a short period of time, 
the security zone in Tremblay was massive, circumscribed by a fence several kilometres long, 
encompassing an important urban centre, surrounding homes and businesses without the consent of 
property owners, blockading many public streets, and policed aggressively for a period of several days. 
The measures taken in Knowlton had little impact on public rights of expression or assembly and minimal 
impact on the freedom of movement along public ways. Private property rights were not unilaterally 
violated in Knowlton as they were in Tremblay. 
Moreover, Canadian constitutional history and practice point in other directions. The creation of 
large “no-go zones” by officials acting on their own initiative in the absence of explicit statutory authority 
tilts a long way toward an arbitrary system of government.  
Finally, although the concept of ancillary police powers has been applied with some frequency in 
Canadian law, the circumstances of its application have always been limited and precise. The doctrine 
typically applies where there are questions about when police may search persons, effects, vehicles, or 
premises,30 or detain a person for short periods for investigation,31 and so on. No reasonable analogy 
would permit the extension of the present ancillary powers doctrine in Canada to authorize Tremblay-
style police measures. 
 
The Ancillary Police Powers Doctrine 
                                               
30
 For example, R. v. Griffith, [2003] A.J. No. 312, 2003 ABPC 46 (Fradsham, Prov. Ct. J.); R. v. Simpson (1993), 
79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Feeney (1997), 115 C.C.C. (3d) 129; R. v. Golub (1997), 117 C.C.C. (3d) 193 
(Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed, [1997] S.C.C.A. No. 571; R. v. Sharpe, [2002] B.C.J. No. 1219; 
2002 BCSC 213 (Shaw J.); R. v. Davis, [2004] A.J. No. 64; 2004 ABCA 33 (Alberta Court of Appeal); R. v. Godoy 
(1998), 131 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.), [affirming] (1997), 115 C.C.C. (3d) 272 (Ont. C.A.). 
31
 For example, R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 2004 SCC 52, rev’g (2002) 169 C.C.C. (3d) 272, 2002 MBCA 
121; R. v. Greaves, [2004] B.C.J. No. 1953, 2004 BCCA 484 . 
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The leading authority on ancillary police powers is Dedman v. The Queen.32 That case deals with a 
Charter challenge to random police stops carried out as part of an anti-impaired-driving program in 
Ontario. Police would ask a driver for his or her licence and proof of insurance and, while doing so, take 
the opportunity to note the condition of the driver. The central issue before the court was whether police 
had the power to briefly detain randomly selected motorists. Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act conferred 
authority to stop vehicles and inspect licences, and both the act and the Criminal Code authorized the 
taking of breath samples in proper circumstances.33 The difficulty in Dedman arose because the stop-
check scheme rested on a ruse: the initial stops were random and the demand to see the licence merely a 
ploy designed to generate reasonable grounds to demand alcohol testing. In exercising a power given for 
one purpose, the police put it to an unauthorized use. The court was unanimous in finding that the powers 
granted could not be validly exercised for a purpose other than that specified in the act. The court 
concluded that the scheme of stop-checks was not authorized by statute. The majority of a divided court 
held that the scheme’s interference with the qualified right of licensed drivers to “circulate in a motor 
vehicle on the public highway”34 was permitted as a necessary extension of common law police powers in 
the particular context of traffic control.35 
In so concluding, the majority applied a modified version of the test of police powers set out in R. 
v. Waterfield.36 Mr. Justice Le Dain’s adapted “Waterfield test” asks first whether the activity in question 
“fell within the general scope of the duties of a police officer under statute or common law” and then 
                                               
32
 [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2 [hereafter Dedman]. 
33
 The Criminal Code explicitly authorizes them to demand breath samples when the “officer reasonably suspects 
that a person who … has care or control of a motor vehicle… has alcohol in his body…” (excerpts from s. 234(1) of 
the Criminal Code, as cited by Le Dain J. in Dedman, para. 49). 
34
 Dedman, per Le Dain J., para. 68. 
35
 “It has been held that at common law the principal duties of police officers are the preservation of the peace, the 
prevention of crime, and the protection of life and property, from which is derived the duty to control traffic on the 
public roads.” Dedman, per Le Dain J., para. 68. 
36
 R. v. Waterfield, [1963] 3 All E.R. 659, at 661–62, as cited in Dedman, per Le Dain J., para. 66. The Waterfield 
test had been accepted as authoritative in the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Stenning, [1970] S.C.R. 631, and in 
Knowlton. 
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whether “a particular interference with liberty is an unjustifiable use of a power associated with a police 
duty.”37 The second stage of inquiry has three parts: 
(1) The interference with liberty must be necessary for the carrying out of the 
particular police duty 
(2) and it must be reasonable, having regard to the nature of the liberty interfered with 
(3) and the importance of the public purpose served by the interference.38 
Mr. Justice Le Dain found in this case that “the seriousness of the problem of impaired driving” was 
sufficient to show the necessity of the program (stage 1) and to demonstrate the importance of the public 
purpose served by it (stage 3). Although stop-checks clearly interfered with liberty, the interference was 
short and the inconvenience caused “slight.”39 
In other cases, the Supreme Court of Canada has reviewed the general principles governing 
ancillary police powers in relation to wiretaps, police entry to residences, and searches upon arrest. As in 
Dedman, the approach of the court in each situation has been cautious, stopping far short of creating a sort 
of plenary police power to do anything that might reasonably be expected to protect property or life or to 
prevent crime. 
In Reference re: Judicature Act (Alberta), s.27(1) (the “Wiretap Reference”),40 the court had to 
decide whether Criminal Code provisions authorizing a wiretap also authorized police to enter private 
property to install the needed equipment. Mr. Justice Estey, for the majority, found that it did. As in 
Dedman, the ancillary police power in question was narrow and closely related to an elaborate statutory 
arrangement surrounding the particular interferences with liberty. 
                                               
37
 Dedman, per Le Dain J., paras. 68, 69. 
38
 Ibid., per Le Dain J., para. 69 (emphasis and paragraph breaks added). 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Reference re: Judicature Act (Alberta), s. 27(1), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 697. 
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In R. v. Godoy,41 the Supreme Court of Canada had to decide whether a forced entry into a home 
in response to a dropped 911 call was justifiable under the Dedman-Waterfield test. Chief Justice Lamer, 
for a unanimous bench, held that the common law police duty to protect life is “engaged whenever it can 
be inferred that the 911 caller is or may be in some distress.”42 This duty may require an intrusion, but, in 
Chief Justice Lamer’s view, “the intrusion must be limited to the protection of life and safety.… The 
police authority for being on private property in response to a 911 call ends there. They do not have 
further permission to search premises or otherwise intrude on a resident’s privacy or property.”43 Again, 
the ancillary police power extrapolated from common law duties is narrowly circumscribed in terms of 
time, place, and persons. 
Cloutier v. Langlois  dealt with the scope of police powers of search on arrest. As in other cases, a 
generalized “reasonableness” test was insufficient to support the asserted police power. Madam Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé, for the court, concluded that searches on arrest are legal if they are conducted in pursuit 
of a valid objective and use only such constraint as is “proportionate to the objectives sought and the other 
circumstances of the situation.” Valid objectives of a search include looking for an object that “may be a 
threat to the safety of the police, the accused or the public, or that may facilitate escape or act as evidence 
against the accused.”44 No more. 
In R. v. Edwards, the Alberta Provincial Court extended the doctrine of ancillary police powers to 
allow for a very limited sort of spatial zoning.45 Upon leaving a bar, two brothers in that case found their 
car behind a temporary police barricade created as police investigated a suspected homicide. When 
officers at the scene refused the brothers’ access to their car, the two became verbally aggressive and were 
arrested for causing a disturbance. Absent any statutory authority preventing individuals from accessing 
                                               
41
 R. v. Godoy, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 311; [1998] S.C.J. No. 85 [hereafter Godoy]. 
42
 Godoy, para. 16. 
43
 Godoy, para. 22. 
44
 Cloutier, paras. 61, 62 
45
 R. v. Edwards, [2004] A.J. No. 68, 2004 ABPC 14, Allen, Prov. Ct. J., para. 1 [hereafter Edwards]. 
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personal property that, through no fault of their own, has become “part of a temporary crime scene,” the 
question was whether police had the right to prevent the brothers from simply driving away. 
Provincial Court Judge Allen considered the scope of the ancillary powers of police, in particular 
the common law duty to detect crime and bring offenders to justice.46 Judge Allen concluded that the 
importance of a murder investigation, the possible forensic relevance of the particular vehicle, the 
temporary nature of the inconvenience, and the necessity of securing the crime scene in order to preserve 
evidence all led to the conclusion that the actions of the police were necessarily incidental to their general 
duty to apprehend offenders and prosecute crime.47 This case resulted in recognition of a police “zoning” 
of sorts but one severely limited in space, time, and application.48 The need here arises in a situation akin 
to an emergency that could not have been planned for in advance and in which no less intrusive options 
are available. The policing of well-anticipated public events bears no comparison. 
In sum, in the absence of express statutory authority, the leading Canadian authorities on the 
ancillary police power provide no support for the proposition that police “zoning” of public space is an 
acceptable means of crowd control. 
 
Statutory Authority for Public Order Policing? 
                                               
46
 Edwards, para. 36. 
47
 Edwards, para. 48. 
48
 Cf. Pace J.A.’s judgment (for the court) in R. v. Williams (N.S.C.A.), [1986] N.S.J. No. 138, which dealt with the 
question of the lawfulness of police traffic control measures imposed during a tall ship event in Halifax. Although it 
might be construed as authorizing a police zoning issue of sorts, the judgment was limited in its application to the 
qualified liberty of driving. The police power to give directions to drivers (including telling them not to drive down 
a particular street) was held to be authorized by the Nova Scotia Motor Vehicle Act, which required drivers to obey 
the instructions of police officers: “Clearly, the legislation intended in enacting Section 74(1) that directions would 
be given by peace officers in the general execution of their duty under the Act, otherwise there would be no 
necessity in imposing a general duty to obey.” Alternatively, he thought that, “even if the implied authority was not 
contained in the Act, I would uphold the conviction on the grounds that it fell within the general scope of duties of a 
police officer to protect life and property by the control of traffic and the direction by the officer was reasonably 
necessary and justifiable under all of the circumstances.”  
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The Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act (1991)49 was amended in 2002 to provide the 
RCMP with  “primary responsibility to ensure the security for the proper functioning of any 
intergovernmental conference in which two or more states participate, that is attended by persons granted 
privileges and immunities under this Act.”50 The act also authorizes the RCMP to “take appropriate 
measures, including controlling, limiting or prohibiting access to any area to the extent and in a manner 
that is reasonable in the circumstances.”51 Assuming that such a broad and imprecise provision might 
withstand constitutional challenge, it could conceivably provide legal authority for operations like those 
challenged in Tremblay. Where, however, there is no intergovernmental conference of the sort that the act 
seeks to protect, the act can have no applicability. Indeed, the express creation of a new police power here 
confirms that such powers do not exist free of statutory authorization. The statute has no applicability 
outside of its specific context. 
The federal Emergencies Act52 authorizes similar measures but only during a “public order 
emergency.” In that event, the governor in council, on reasonable grounds and where necessary for 
dealing with the emergency, may prohibit a public assembly, ban travel within a specified area, or 
constrain the use of property.53 These powers have never been invoked and are not a suitable foundation 
for policing large public events. 
                                               
49
 S.C. 1991, c. 41. 
50
 S.C. 2002, c. 12, s. 10.1(1). 
51
 S. 10.1(2). 
52
 R.S.C. 1985, c. 22 (4th Supp.).  
Similarly, it is remotely possible that powers contained in provincial emergencies legislation such as Ontario’s 
Emergency Management Act (R.S.O. 1990, c. E.9 Amended by: S.O. 1999, c. 12, Sched. P, ss. 3–5, 7–9; S.O. 2002, 
c. 17, Sched. C, s. 10; S.O. 2002, c. 4, ss. 2–5, 7–16; S.O. 2003, c. 1, s. 14) could be brought into play in some 
public policing contexts. Section 7.1(2), for example, permits the executive to “temporarily suspend the operation of 
a provision of a statute, regulation, rule, by-law or order of the Government of Ontario” and to “set out a 
replacement provision” during the period of the emergency. These extraordinary powers could, of course, only be 
lawfully deployed in truly extraordinary circumstances. 
53
 S. 19(1). 
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Sections 63 to 68 of the Criminal Code prohibit causing a disturbance or creating an unlawful 
assembly or a riot and give police specific powers in relation to those prohibitions. An unlawful assembly 
involves a common purpose that causes fear among others that the persons gathered may “disturb the 
peace tumultuously.” A riot is “an unlawful assembly that has begun to disturb the peace tumultuously.” 
Section 67 allows a “justice, mayor or sheriff” or a deputy, when satisfied that a riot is in progress, to 
“command silence” and read a proclamation that commands participants “peaceably to depart … on the 
pain of being guilty of an offence for which, on conviction, they may be sentenced to imprisonment for 
life.” Rarely used,54 these provisions provide some evidence of what was considered justifiable in a free 
society in the decades before adoption of the Charter. Police are given authority to “disperse or arrest” 
individuals who do not comply with the section 67 proclamation,55 licence to use as much force as is 
necessary and reasonable “to suppress a riot,”56 and immunity from civil or criminal proceedings arising 
“by reason of resistance.”57 Note, however, the relatively rare and particular circumstances that must 
obtain before these powers are authorized. 
 
Property Rights and Protest 
What of the rights of property owners — including municipalities and governments — to limit access to 
their property? The general rule, based on the tort of trespass, is that they may do as they wish with their 
land and that they enjoy an unconstrained right to prohibit access to individuals or groups.58 Private 
property owners do not need to be concerned with balancing their desires against the countervailing 
interests of the wider community in the exercise of freedom of assembly, movement, or speech. The 
                                               
54
 Among a few other cases, the Riot Act was read by the mayor of Penticton during 1991. R. v. Loewen (1992), 75 
C.C.C. (3d) 184. 
55
 S. 33, Criminal Code. 
56
 S. 32, Criminal Code. 
57
 S. 33 (2), Criminal Code. 
58
 See, for example, Philip Osborne, The Law of Torts, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003), Chapter 4, “Intentional 
Torts,” Part D, “Intentional Interference with Land: Trespass to Land.” Property rights can be protected by self-help 
(using such force as is necessary and reasonable in the circumstances), injunctive relief, or action for damages. 
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property rights of public authorities, however, are a different matter. They are bound both by the values of 
common law constitutionalism and by the written constitution. 
The seminal authority in this respect is the Supreme Court of Canada’s judgment in Committee 
for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada.59 The case arose at Montreal’s Dorval airport, which, at the 
time, was owned by the federal government. In March 1984, the respondents,  members of the Committee 
for the Commonwealth of Canada, were stopped by the RCMP when they sought to disseminate 
information at the airport. Airport management took the view that the committee’s actions were in 
violation of the Government Airport Concession Operations Regulations,60 which prohibited any 
advertising or solicitation in the airport.61 The matter went to court when the respondents sought a 
declaration that their fundamental freedoms had been violated. The court unanimously held that the 
respondents’ freedom of expression had been improperly infringed. 
The Government of Canada argued that government property becomes a sort of “Charter-free 
zone” through the magic of ownership rights, with the result that constitutional protections for freedom of 
expression, freedom of assembly, and the like could be circumvented as an incident of the control of 
property. Chief Justice Lamer and Mr. Justice Sopinka rejected the government’s “absolutist approach to 
the right of ownership,” noting that restricting the right of freedom of expression “solely to places owned 
by the person wishing to communicate” would have the effect of denying “the very foundation of the 
freedom of expression.”62 Although the court split three ways in approach, the justices were unanimous in 
their rejection of the government’s property rights argument. 
The principal difficulty became one of determining where and how to draw the line between 
appropriate regulation of government-owned spaces and improper interference with constitutionally 
protected rights. The court focused on the interplay between section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of 
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 Supra note 5. 
60
 SOR/79-373. 
61
 Commonwealth of Canada, per L’Heureux-Dubé J., para. 50. 
62
 Commonwealth of Canada, per Lamer C.J., para. 15. 
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Rights and Freedoms and section 1’s limitations. The entire court viewed the government’s privileges as a 
property owner as constrained by public rights. Each of the judgments sought to balance expression 
against the appropriate need to regulate public space (recall that this was done formally under statute and 
delegated legislation in this case) and recognized that a sliding scale of protections attaches to different 
places in different circumstances. Even sites to which a high degree of expressive liberty attaches could 
be regulated for reasons such as the maintenance of law and order.63 All of the justices took the view that 
constitutional protection of liberty of expression would attach most strongly to the types of public 
property traditionally associated with expressive activities: public expression in streets and parks and 
analogous places is prima facie entitled to a high level of constitutional protection of freedom of 
expression.64 
Commonwealth of Canada clearly establishes that government property ownership cannot in and 
of itself provide exemption from constitutional protections. Regulation of government property by means 
of legislation directed at limiting violence, ensuring the effective functioning of public facilities, 
protecting safety, and so on is acceptable. But attempts to limit public discourse, to control what people 
can say or who can speak, are another matter. In evaluating the appropriateness of government regulation 
of expressive activity, the courts are alive to the fact that there should be more rigorous scrutiny of 
government regulation directed at controlling the content of speech than at regulating only the “time, 
place, and manner” of expression.65 
The appropriateness of attempts to regulate expression, assembly, or movement on government 
property has been considered by the courts on a number of occasions since. Incompatibility of function 
was held to permit staff to evict a protester from government offices at the end of the working day in R. v. 
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 Commonwealth of Canada, Lamer C.J., para. 22. A similar approach was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Montreal (City) v. 2952-1366 Quebec Inc., [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141, para. 74.  
64
 Commonwealth of Canada, Lamer C.J., paras. 3, 5, 9, 14; McLachlin J., paras. 224, 225, 227, 256; L’Heureux-
Dubé J., para. 141; La Forest J., para. 45. 
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 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927. 
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McBain,66 while the removal of structures from Parliament Hill was upheld in Weisfeld v. Canada67 — 
but only on a section 1 analysis. Although the line between an exercise of management right over 
property (please stand to the right when you line up) and regulation that must be accomplished by means 
of legislation is somewhat unclear, it seems likely that large-scale infringements of public rights would be 
justifiable only if authorized by legislation capable of withstanding constitutional scrutiny. 
Two recent Ontario cases addressed the intersection between the protection of public property by 
means of the ordinary law of trespass and constitutionally protected rights. In R. v. Behrens,68 charges 
were laid under Ontario’s Trespass to Property Act against individuals who entered the grounds of the 
Ontario legislature (“Queen’s Park”) to participate peacefully and lawfully in a protest against 
government policies. They had been banned, however, from the grounds by the speaker as a result of an 
earlier protest at which they had poured water-soluble stage blood on the building. Had this been private 
property, all the elements of the offence under the Trespass to Property Act would have been made out. 
Applying all three Commonwealth of Canada tests, Quon J.P. concluded that the speaker’s initial ban had 
been justified “since the expressive activity is not the type of expression protected by section 2(b).” The 
government’s interest in preserving public buildings for the benefit of the public is a reasonable limitation 
that justifies keeping specific individuals away from public property. It bears noting only that the speaker 
of the legislature is no ordinary government functionary. The peculiarity of a situation that invokes 
parliamentary privilege is not easily translated to other circumstances. 
Similar circumstances arose in less rarefied spaces in R. v. Semple.69 The defendants were 
charged under the provisions of Ontario’s Trespass to Property Act for entering the grounds of Toronto 
City Hall despite being banned from doing so. At the relevant time, a memorial that they had been 
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 R. v. McBain, [1992] A.J., No. 515, 129 A.R. 352 (Alta. Prov. Ct.) 
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attending had segued into a demonstration in support of the homeless. The issue was whether the City of 
Toronto’s rights as a property owner were outweighed by constitutional protections contained in the 
Charter. Knazan J. found that peaceful entry into the square was a form of expression and that the City of 
Toronto’s notice under the Trespass to Property Act had the effect of violating Charter rights70 that in the 
circumstances could not be justified under the terms of section 1.71 
In sum, public bodies do not enjoy the unfettered prerogatives of ownership of private property 
owners. Attempts by public authorities to restrict expression or assembly under the guise of “property 
management” will be subject to constitutional challenge. A high level of scrutiny attaches to spaces such 
as public parks, public streets, and sites that hold special symbolic meaning in relation to particular 
expressive activities. These are precisely the sorts of spaces that police will seek to “zone” during the 
Olympics. 
 
Part 3: Public Order Police Legislation from Other Jurisdictions 
Legislatures in both the United Kingdom and Australia have recognized that ordinary civil liberties 
should not be compromised by police action without specific statutory authority. Statutes passed in those 
two countries demonstrate that statutory guidelines can clarify the power and role of police and establish a 
better balancing of liberty and security than can be attained by policing officials acting without statutory 
guidance.72 
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 R. v. Semple, para. 34: “[T]he decision of the Supreme Court in Committee for Commonwealth leads to the 
conclusion that the notices of prohibition in this case, by prohibiting all activity, entitle the defendants to the 
protection of s. 2(b). The act of entering the square meets the broad interpretation of Justice L’Heureux-Dubé. The 
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 R. v. Semple, para. 59. 
72
 For a further example of public order police legislation in a common law jurisdiction, see also the Regulation of 
Gathering Act, 1993, Republic of South Africa, No. 205 of 1993. 
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The United Kingdom’s Public Order Act of 1986 and the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 
of 1994 provide illustration.73 The Public Order Act defines a range of offences, including “riot,” “violent 
disorder,” and “affray.” It sets out rules for the staging of demonstrations or protests (“processions and 
assemblies”) and imposes the requirement for notice to be given to police of the date, time, and area of 
the proceeding. If, however, a chief of police has a reasonable belief that, “because of the particular 
circumstances” existing in a district or area, police powers under the act would be insufficient to prevent 
“serious public disorder,” he or she can apply for an order prohibiting the protest or assembly.74 
Alternatively, a chief officer can allow the protest or assembly with conditions as to place, duration, and 
number of people who may attend, so long as the conditions seem necessary to prevent “disorder, 
damage, disruption or intimidation.”75 
The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act amends the earlier act, creating new public order 
categories of “disruptive trespassers” and “trespassory assemblies” and the new offence of “aggravated 
trespass.”76 This occurs when a person trespasses on land and does something to intimidate or disrupt 
others carrying on lawful activities. Reflecting long-standing common law freedoms, the act specifically 
excludes “highways and roads” from the definition of land. A trespassory assembly is any assembly of 
persons on land to which the public has either no right of access or a limited right and is conducting itself 
in a manner that a chief police officer reasonably believes “may result — (i) in serious disruption to the 
life of the community, or (ii) where the land, or a building or monument on it, is of historical, 
architectural, archaeological or scientific importance, in significant damage to the land, building or 
monument.”77 In this case, the officer must apply to a council of the district for an order prohibiting the 
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assembly for a specific period of time, which may not exceed four days and five miles from the specified 
location.78 
The New South Wales APEC Meeting (Police Powers) Act 2007 is more far-reaching in scope 
though limited in duration. It deals specifically with the creation of exclusion zones and the scope of 
police powers with respect to them.79 The primary concepts of the act are those of the “APEC Security 
Area” and the “APEC period,” both defined terms, with detailed maps provided in a schedule. Police 
could exercise certain powers within the APEC Security Area, which included a “declared area” (the 
neighbourhood surrounding the buildings and sites at issue) and a “restricted area” (the buildings and sites 
themselves). The APEC period lasted only from August 30 to September 12, 2007. 
The act authorized police to take a number of measures that would otherwise have been unlawful. 
It permitted “check points, cordons or roadblocks” to stop vehicles or persons attempting to enter or move 
through the APEC Security Area and to conduct warrantless searches. Police could also seize anything on 
a list of “prohibited items,”80 including spray-paint cans, chains, flares, and other flammables. Without 
notice, police could also close roads in the Security Area, but for only the “shortest possible period” and 
for limited purposes, including the safety of persons travelling to meetings and the protection of property. 
The act also created the offence of entering a “restricted area” without “special justification” (a 
defined term). This could include the need “to be in (or pass through) the area for the purposes of [a] 
person’s employment, occupation, profession, calling, trade or business or for any other work-related 
purpose ....”81 The act created even wider police powers. A person alleged to have obstructed police or 
damaged property during the APEC period was subject to a rebuttable presumption against the granting of 
bail. Other sections provided for the use of force by persons assisting police and for maintaining a list of 
                                               
78
 S. 14A(6). 
79
 http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/repealed_act/ampa2007252/index.html#s1 (accessed July 20, 2009). The 
act was repealed shortly after the event. 
80
 Part 3 of the act. 
81
 S. 37. 
 Pue/Diab, Public Order Policing, 2009-08-06  26
“excluded persons.” The act immunized the state from liability for nuisance with respect to anything done 
in the exercise of powers under the act. 
It is unclear whether the powers allocated to police under the APEC Meeting Act would be 
appropriate in British Columbia or would survive a Charter challenge under the proportionality 
requirements of a section 1 analysis. The New South Wales legislation does, however, starkly underline 
the need for explicit statutory authorization to be granted in order to authorize seemingly prudent security 
precautions. The government of New South Wales demonstrated integrity and courage in establishing 
clear guidelines for the policing of a major event. It is telling that in Canada police officials claim similar 
powers de facto without cover of legislation. 
 
Conclusion 
There is a clear need for legislation that would explicitly grant policing authorities the powers that they 
need in order to lawfully ensure the safety of the public during large public events.82 The need for security 
measures to be taken in advance of these occasions is not open to serious question. But our analysis has 
shown that there is no foundation in Canadian law for the types of proactive and preventative common-
sense policing that is increasingly common in events of this magnitude. Legislation is needed to fill the 
gap. Although their exact contours need to be mapped out through legislative processes, many of those 
powers will prove to be both unusual and intrusive. Without meaning to endorse the particular way in 
which a balance has been struck in either the United Kingdom or New South Wales, the examples set in 
those two jurisdictions point to both the necessity and the possibility of legislation that will address this 
gap in Canada. 
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